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RECIPROCITY IN STATE TAXATION AS THE NEXT STEP
IN EMPIRICAL LEGISLATION
ALBERT SMITH FAUGHT t
The expectation that the due process clause might inhibit two or
more states from exacting taxes as to the same intangible personal
property has become merely a matter of history. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in dischssing, some fifteen years ago, problems of double tax-
ation of personal property said: "Wise tax policy is one thing; consti-
tutional prohibition quite another." I
Glancing backward he added: "The task of devising means for
distributing the burdens of taxation equitably has always challenged the
wisdom of the wisest financial statesmen." Looking forward Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter envisaged the task laid at the door of the legislatures:
"Never has this been more true than today when wealth has so
largely become the capitalization of expectancies derived from a
complicated network of human relations. The adjustment of such
relationships, with due regard to the promotion of enterprise and
to the financial needs of the different governments with which
these relations are entwined, is peculiarly a phase of empirical
legislation."
The legislatures of the several states are, in large measure, left
free, as far as the federal Constitution is concerned, to formulate their
own tax policies.
Yet the Supreme Court has manifested a willingness to reconsider
its own pronouncements. Within the memory of lawyers whose careers
at the bar began with the depression, our highest Court has overruled
several of its own decisions in the field of state taxation which had been
announced as sound constitutional doctrine only a few years before
they were stricken down and denied vitality.
Three questions may be involved in the concerted planning for
the solution of state taxation problems. Is there any probability that
the Supreme Court, during early years after the termination of the
war, will revitalize constitutional prohibitions which were deemed
effective six or eight years ago but which have since been limited so
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as not to impinge upon state taxation policies? How should we
appraise the more recent pronouncements of the Court in this field?
Is there prospect for concerted action by the several states in the
formulation and administration of taxation systems?
The present article faces these three inquiries.
I. THE JUDCiAL BACKGROUND
During the past ten years approximately one hundred reported
cases have reached the highest court of this country involving state
taxation. Unanimity in decision has been attained in about two-thirds
of these proceedings, but in the remaining cases one or more of the
justices have voiced dissent from the conclusions reached by the
majority. Manifestations of divided counsel among those entrusted
with final authority may be safely regarded as normal.
The background of judicial opinion may be explored in another
direction, for, within the narrow domain of state tax litigation, we
find several occasions in which the Supreme Court has overruled its
own recent pronouncements.
Double taxation was condemned in First National Bank of Boiton
v. Maine 2 on January 4, 1932. This case was overruled seven years
later in Curry v. McCanless3 and Graves v. Elliott 4 on May 29, 1939,
and no longer is it necessary for the states to avoid all possibility of
taxing twice the same economic interest or property.
A second instance is the overruling of Colgate v. Harvey,5 decided
on December 16, 1935, by Madden v. Kentucky,6 in which the Supreme
Court withdrew from its earlier view as to the effectiveness of the
privileges and immunities clause in inhibiting a state from discrimi-
nation in taxing of income from moneys loaned without the state as
compared with moneys loaned within the state. The Court materially
revised its views in less than five years.
Again we find that in Graves v. New York, ' the Supreme Court
after the brief period of two years refused to countenance the continued
validity of New York v. Graves 8 or Brush v. Commissioner as estab-
lishing immunit from state taxation.
2. First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L.
Ed. 313 (1932).
3.- Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. goo, 83 L. Ed. 1339 (1939).
4. Graves v. Elliott, 3o7 U. S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913, 83 L. Ed. 1356 (939).
5. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 4o4, 56 Sup. Ct. 252, 8o L. Ed. 299 (935).
6. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 6o Sup. Ct 4o6, 84 L. Ed. 590 (940).
7. Graves v. New York, 3o6 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. Ed. 927 (1939).
8. New York v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 237, 8z L. Ed. 3o6 (937);
Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct 495, 81 L. Ed.
61 (I937).
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It is significant that all three instances of overruling of prior recent
decisions are steps taken by the Supreme Court in the same direction
and constitute successive declarations of increased powers of the states
in the realm of taxation.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter explains that we have been witnessing an
"important shift in constitutional doctrine." 9 He accurately attributes
this shift to the changes which have occurred in the membership of the
Court.
When the condemnation of double taxation of intangible personal
property, expressed by the Supreme Court so clearly in First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine, was abandoned in Curry v. McCanless and
Graves v. Elliott, not a single member of this country's highest tribunal
altered his individual opinion. When Madden v. Martin overturned
Colgate v. Harvey each of the justices who participated in both decisions
remained adamant. The shift in doctrine was that of the Court and
not of the participating justices. Also, when we observe the dissident
opinions in the Brush case (Justices Brandeis and Roberts dissenting
with Justices Stone and Cardozo concurring in the result), and note the
composition of the Court when this decision was overruled in the second
Graves case, we find no visible manifestation of changes in the view-
points of the justices who participated in the two decisions.
Against this judicial background of nearly one hundred separately
reported cases dealing with state taxation problems during the past
decade, certain conclusions emerge:
First. In reference to state taxation the members of the Supreme
Court adhere closely to their individual viewpoints. There is no visible
sign of shift in constitutional doctrine on the part of any of the justices
whose notations of dissent and dissenting opinions are found freely
scattered through these cases.
Second. The shift in doctrine relating to state taxation problems,
manifested by the Supreme Court as a tribunal of final resort, is toward
an expanding recognition of freedom on the part of the states in the
imposition and collection of taxes.
Third. This series of taxation decisions points to permanency in
this tendency. We may not only anticipate that individual members of
the Court will adhere to their own viewpoints in this field, but we
should accept as permanent the visible trend of the Supreme Court
toward upholding state taxation statutes whenever possible. Certain
limitations still exist some of which appear enumerated by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in State Tax Commission of
9. Concurring opinion in Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 466, 487, 59 Sup. Ct. 595,
602, 83 L. Ed. 927, 937 (1939).
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Utah v. Aldrich.10 This case may serve.as a convenient base from
which further progress may perhaps be measured by those who still
seek the resolution of some of the problems of conflicting state taxation.
II. SIGNPOSTS TO RECIPROCITY
The Aldrich case presents in timely fashion three divergent opin-
ions. Their importance justifies the use of twenty-five printed pages
to set forth the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, the concurring
views of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and the dissent by Mr. Justice
Jackson.
Without undue brevity their respective positions as to state tax-
ation and its remaining constitutional limitations may now be sum-
marized. Mr. Justice Douglas said:
"More basically, even though we believed that a different system
should be designed to protect against multiple taxation, it is not
our province to provide it. To do so would be to indulge in the
dangerous assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment 'was
intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral
beliefs in its prohibitions'. It would violate the first principles of
constitutional adjudication to strike down state legislation on the
basis of our individual views or preferences as to policy, whether
the state laws deal with taxes or other subjects of social or
economic legislation." 11
Mr. Justice Jackson in writing the dissenting opinion (in which
Mr. Justice Roberts concurred) said 12:
"State taxation of transfer by death of intangible property is in
something of a jurisdictional snarl, to the solution of which this
Court owes all that it has of wisdom and power.
"The effect of the Court's decision is to intensify the already
unwholesome conflict and friction between the states of the Union
in competitive exploitation of intangible property as a source of
death duties.
"The multiple taxation added substantially to the cost of admin-
istration and to the annoyance of taxpayers. Because of these
considerations, at the time of argument of First National Bank v.
Maine, thirty-seven states had enacted reciprocity statutes which
voluntarily renounced revenues from this type of taxation. The
io. State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. x74, 62 Sup. Ct ioo8, 86
L. Ed. 1358 (I942).
ii. Mr. Justice Douglas, id. at i81, 62 Sup. Ct at 1OI2, 86 L. Ed. at 1370.
12. Mr. Justice Jackson, id. at 185, 191, 197, 62 Sup. Ct. at 1013, Ioi6, ioI9, 86 L.
Ed. at X372, 1375, 1379.
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Court was urged to stay the hand of sister states which would not
co6perate. The restraint laid by this Court in response to those
appeals is now withdrawn at the behest of a state which has at
no time enacted a reciprocity statute or given a credit for such
taxes paid by its domiciled decedents elsewhere."
In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter we read:
"But whether a tax is wise or expedient is the business of the
political branches of government, not ours. Considerations rele-
vant to invalidation of a tax measure are wholly different from
those that come into play in justifying disapproval of a tax on the
score of political or financial unwisdom.
"It may well be that the last word has not been said by the
various devices now available-through uniform and reciprocal
legislation, through action by the States under the Compact Clause,
Art. I, Sec. Io, Cl. 3, or through whatever other means statesmen
may devise-for distributing wisely the total national income for
governmental purposes as between the States and the Nation." 13
The foregoing philosophy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter was ex-
pressed by him some three years before in Newark Fire Insurance Co. v.
State Board of Tax Appeals,14 which we now quote at length:
"Wise tax policy is one thing, constitutional prohibition quite
another. The task of devising means for distributing the burdens
of taxation equitably has always challenged the wisdom of the
wisest financial statesmen. Never has this been more true than
today when wealth has so largely become the capitalization of
expectancies derived from a complicated network of human rela-
tions. The adjustment of such relationships, with due regard to
the promotion of enterprise and to the fiscal needs of different
governments with which these relations are entwined, is peculiarly
a phase of empirical legislation. It belongs to that range of the
experimental activities of government which should not be con-
strained by rigid and artificial legal concepts. Especially impor-
tant is it to abstain from intervention within the autonomous area
of the legislative taxing power where there is no claim of encroach-
ment by the states upon powers granted to the national govern-
ment. It is not for us to sit in judgment on attempts by the states
to evolve fair tax policies. When a tax appropriately challenged
before us is not found to be in plain violation of the Constitution
our task is ended."
At that time three of his colleagues joined in the views thus
expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Since the individual members
of the Court seem to adhere closely to their own previously announced
13. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, id. at 182, 62 Sup. Ct. at io02, 86 L. Ed. at 1372.
14. Brown, The Present Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangible Personal Prop-
erty (1942) 40 MIcH. L. REv. 8o6.
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views in state taxation cases we are justified in believing that Chief
Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas still
accept as sound the foregoing expression of constitutional doctrine.
The signposts discernible in the various opinions in the Aldrich
case point in one direction. The unwholesome conflicts between the
several states in competitive taxation may in time be diminished or
eliminated by such means as uniform or reciprocal legislation.
I1. SCOPE OF POSSIBLE RECIPROCAL LEGISLATION AS TO
STATE TAXES
Many kinds of taxes imposed by states involve grave possibilities
of competitive conflict:
I. The ad valorem taxation of intangible personal property.
2. The taxation of transfer by death of intangible personal prop-
erty (now "in something of a jurisdictional snarl," Mr. Justice Jack-
son has reminded us). This question involves domicile and its
determination.
3. The taxation of corporations doing business in more than one
state. This may involve a consideration of the present effect of the
interstate commerce clause, and the allocation by various formulas of
taxes on income or gross receipts, or on tangible and intangible prop-
erty belonging to a corporation, and also the right of the state of incor-
poration to tax benefits resulting from granting the charter, and the
right of a stateto impose taxes based on the actual or "business situs"
of a corporation. (On this point Mr. Justice Jackson, in the Aldrich
case, forecast: "Our tomorrows will witness an extension of the tax-
ing power of the chartering or issuing states to corporate bonds and
bonds of states and municipalities.")
4. Sales and use taxes, and fees for inspection of -property im-
ported into a state, and charges for use of highways by vehicles owned
or operated by non-residents.
It is a matter of history that conflicting interests of large and
small states were studied by those who once met in Carpenter's Hall
and these differences were adjusted by compromises which became in-
corporated in the Constitution of the United States. Adjustment of con-
flicting interests through reciprocity legislation is indicated by the sign-
posts already examined. The practical question arises whether these
adjustments should be worked out piece-meal and separately for each
type of state tax, or should a table be prepared and dishes placed thereon
which may be palatable and unpalatable, and each state be invitea to
partake of a balanced meal?
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In the international field nations are learning to work together.
The various states may indeed be willing to co6perate one with another,
so as to eliminate conflicts in tax demands, and to adjust and settle con-
troversies quickly.
Let us probe further into the nature of the problems involved in
each of several important classes of state taxes.
IV. AD VALOREm TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES
Some seven centuries ago wealth, other than land and livestock,
was concentrated in tangible personal property, chiefly jewelry and
gold, which could be carried on the person or be secretly hidden far
from the prying eye of any royal tax collector. To prevent moveable
wealth from escaping taxation, a fiction was invented, expressed in
classic Latin: "Mobilia sequuntur personam." Wherever the owner
happened to reside there it was his moveable personal property could be
taxed.15
Now there are good fictions, and there are fictions which prove
troublesome and which will not die, even after seven centuries. In due
course of time it became established doctrine in America that this fiction
was untrue, and not to be applied in the taxation of tangible personal
property. We may now observe the partial escape of intangibles from
the grasp of this same fiction through resort to the doctrine of "busi-
ness situs," for intangibles may be taxed today at their business situs.
For an elucidation of this new concept, we are indebted to the dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Butler in Curry v. McCanless.'0
"The phrase 'business situs' as used to support jurisdiction of a
state other than that of the domicile of the owner to impose taxes
on intangible personal property is a metaphorical expression of
vague signification."
The seven hundred year old fiction has found a playfellow, "a
metaphorical expression of vague significance." This pair of Till Eulen-
spiegels may cheerfully visit the legislative halls of the forty-eight states,
knowing that tax policy is one thing, and constitutional prohibitions
quite another. Each fairy goodfellow grants a different boon. The
magic word "mobilia" allows the states to tax intangibles at the own-
er's domicile; the mystic words "business situs" permit the states to
tax the same securities wherever they are found used in business; and
15. Explained by Mr. Justice Van Devanter in Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S.
473, 493, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 6o6, 69 L. Ed. 1O58, io64 (1925).
16. Mr. Justice Butler, 307 U. S. 357, 381-382, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 912, 83 L. Ed.
1339, 1356 (1939).
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still a third "goodfellow" has popped out of the Aldrich case to whisper
"The chartering state may also impose taxes on stocks and bonds."
Yet the taxpayer has one consolation. All that he need do is to maintain
his only domicile in the particular state in which he keeps his intangible
personal property, and to be sure that he invests only in securities of
corporations chartered in that State. It is a simple formula, and so
easy to follow that no one has as yet suggested that its effect would be
to "Balkanize" his business and confine his activities to the generous
confines of any one of these United States.1
7
Our hero, the taxpayer, must also be careful to patronize only
home banks, for the Supreme Court in Madden v. Kentucky,'- upheld
the right of a state to tax on an ad valorem basis bank deposits of its
citizens placed in banks outside the state at fifty cents per hundred dol-
lars while imposing such taxes at the rate of ten cents per hundred dol-
lars in banks located within the state. The reason for upholding the
discrimination against banks beyond the state seems to be that "By
placing the duty of collection on local banks the tax on local deposits
was made almost self-collecting," while greater difficulties surrounded
the collection of the tax on deposits in banks in other states.
We can see without glasses the need for practical working agree-
ments between the states, preferably in the form of reciprocity legisla-
tion, as a cure for some of the evils of multiple taxation of intangible
personal property.
V. DOMICILE AND THE DOUBLE TAXATION OF ESTATES AND
INHERITANCES
In our early youth we erroneously believed that a man had at one
time only one legal residence and domicile. The Dorrance litigation
has educated every lawyer to the dangers of double domicile or con-
flicting claims as to domicile. If it were necessary to convince those
who do not digest the decisions and opinions of the country's highest
court it should suffice to invite attention to the litigation by four sov-
ereign states, each claiming the right to impose death or inheritance or
estate taxes on property owned and enjoyed during his lifetime, by the
late Edward H. R. Green. The practical consequences of uncertainty
17. "Balkanize" has been happily used by Chief justice Stone, speaking for the
entire Court in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 311, 316, 86 L.
Ed. 294, 300 (1941) : "It is a tempting escape from a difficult question to pass to Con-
gress the responsibility for continued existence of local restraints and obstructions to
national commerce. . . . The practical result is that in default of action by us they
will go on suffocating and retarding and Balkanizing American commerce, trade and
industry." (Italics supplied.)
18. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 6o Sup. Ct. 4o6, 84 L. Ed. 59o (i94o).
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as to the true domicile of one who travels is to be found in State of
Texas v. State of Florida.19
We may close the book 20 and ask the question as to whether sov-
ereign commonwealths will ever forego the chance of windfalls, and
agree upon some practical method, not of locating the magnetic North
Pole, but ascertaining the actual legal residence and domicile of one
who has died and who can no longer be personally examined on this
fact which may determine which state gets the lion's share of taxes on
his estate.
By general agreement of the states, certain principles should be
established as to domicile. First, there should be only one legal domi-
cile for inheritance tax purposes; second, a definite formula should be
prepared for the exact and prompt determination of conflicting claims
as to domicile and the right to collect such taxes; and third, in the
event of conflicting determinations by the courts of last resort of two
or more states in regard to a particular decedent, the door should be
open to negotiation and compromise by the governors of the states
affected.
VI. ALLOCATION OF CORPORATE TAXES
We now approach a diamond of many facets. To.escape the
dazzling effect, let us examine separately each facet which gleams in
this dark corner of state taxation.
To begin at the beginning, each state has unquestioned powers to
admit or refuse to admit a foreign corporation seeking to engage in
business within its borders, and it may impose reasonable conditions
and stiff entrance fees. The clearest recent case is Atlantic Refining
Company v. Commonwealth of Virginia."
Here the Supreme Court upheld the right of the state to impose
an entrance fee for the privilege of doing local business within its
boundaries. The fee was $5000, being measured by the authorized
capital of the corporation at the time of the application. The fee, said
19. Texas v. Florida, 3o6 U. S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (939). Cita-
tions of various cases involving the Dorrance litigation appear id. at 411, 59 Sup. Ct.
at 570, 83 L. Ed. at 827.
20. But before actually closing the book let us read the doctrine as to the situs of
intangibles for purposes of inheritance or Succession Taxes. In Graves v. Schmidlapp,
•315 U. S. 657, 660, 62 Sup. Ct 870, 872, 86 L. Ed. 1o97, 1100 (1942), Chief Justice
Stone said: "The power to tax 'is an incident of sovereignty and is coextensive with
that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state
extends are objects of taxation. . . .' Intangibles which are legal relationships be-
tween persons and which in fact have no geographical location, are so associated with
the owner that they and their transfer at death are taxable at the place of his domi-
cile. . . .
21. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U. S. 22, 58 Sup. Ct. 75, 82 L. Ed. 24
(I937).
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Mr. Justice Brandeis for a unanimous bench .(the Chief Justice, how-
ever, not participating in the case) "is comparable to the charter or
incorporation fee of a domestic corporation."
When a corporation has been duly admitted to engage in local
business the state may, under Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp,22 levy an
annual franchise tax "measured by a graduated charge upon such pro-
portion of the outstanding capital stock, surplus and undivided profits,
plus its long term obligations, as the gross receipts of its 'local' business
bear to the total gross receipts from its entire business." Mr. Justice
Reed gave the rationale of the decision:
"In a unitary enterprise, property outside of the state, when cor-
related in use with property within the state, necessarily affects
the worth of the privilege within the state."
The formulas used in different states greatly vary. They are
valid if the method of allocation is one which is "fairly calculated" to
assign to the taxing state that portion of the net income reasonably
attributable to the business done there. As explained in Butler Broth-
ers v. McColgan,23 "one who attacks a formula of apportionment car-
ries a distinct burden of showing by 'clear and cogent evidence' that it
results in extraterritorial values being taxed . . . We cannot say
that property, payroll and sales are inappropriate ingredients of any
apportionment formula."
One or two cases may suffice to illustrate the operation of the con-
stitutional test mentioned above, that a state may not tax extraterri-
torial values. In James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,2 4 the defendant did
work of fabrication in Pittsburgh, and installed the resulting products
in the construction of dams in West Virginia. Chief Justice Hughes
decided that a gross receipts tax -of the latter state was invalid as to
fabrications done outside of the state, but effective as to .receipts from
activities within its borders.
It will be observed that the Dravo case does not rest on asserted
violation of the commerce clause. But there have been many cases in
which a gross receipts tax was stricken down as improperly burdening
interstate commr'rrce. One of the clearest of these is Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,25 in which a Washington law was held
22. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331, 336, 6o Sup. Ct. 273, 276, 84 L.
Ed. 304, 306 (1939).
23. Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 507, 62 Sup. Ct 701, 704, 83 L.
Ed. 99i, 996 (1942).
2. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 55
(1937).
25. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 59 Sup. Ct. 325, 83 L.
Ed. 272 (939).
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invalid which imposed a privilege tax based on gross income measured
by the entire volume of interstate commerce without any effort to appor-
tion it. Mr. Justice Stone explained that while interstate commerce
may be required to pay its way by bearing its share of local tax bur-
dens, a state may not levy a tax in such a way that it would expose
the business to a multiple tax burden in the event that other states
should impose a similar tax, particularly where the tax is measured by
the entire amount of commerce. The fatal defect is not actual double
taxation but "the risk of a multiple burden to which local commerce
is not exposed."
The present constitutional theory as to interstate commerce is
further expounded in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,26 in
which Mr. Justice Stone summarizes the law:
. .. and if the property devoted to interstate transportation
is used both within and without the state, a tax fairly apportioned
to its use within the state will be sustained. . . . The multi-
plication of state taxes measured by the gross receipts from inter-
state transactions would spell the destruction of interstate com-
merce and renew the barriers to interstate trade which it was the
object of the commerce clause to remove."
Our picture of the present state of the law may be sufficiently com-
plete to make manifest several points: (i) The local business may be
taxed even when performed by a corporation doing business in two or
more states. (2) Any apportionment formula will be sustained which
reasonably measures the gross receipts attributable to local activities.
(3) Local property, local payrolls and sales made within the state are
proper factors in apportioning the gross income for taxation purposes.
(4) No tax may be imposed on interstate operations which, if dupli-
cated in another state, would involve the risk of multiple taxation.
It is clear that we have entered another field in which it should be
relatively easy for the states to agree one with another. It is greatly
to be desired that apportioning formulas should be standardized, so that
a corporation doing business in more than one state need establish only
a single accounting system which will be adequate to meet the needs of
the Federal laws and also the taxing statutes of each of the states in
which it carries on operations. -
One additional step should be taken. The dominant purpose of the
commerce clause, explained in the Live Stock case, namely, the nega-
tion of state barriers hampering interstate trade, should be made the
26. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255, 256, 58 Sup. Ct.
546, 548, 549, 82 L. Ed. 823, 82, 828 (1938).
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objective and goal of all statutes regulating. the business of foreign cor-
porations, particularly taxing laws.
Attention is invited to the comment in the Live Stock case that a
tax may be sustained "as a method of arriving at the fair measure of a
tax substituted for local property taxes." 27
Local property taxes and gross receipts taxes, it will thus be seen,
are closely interrelated.
VII. SALES AND USE TAXES; INSPECTION FEES ON IMPORTS; AND
CHARGES FOR USE OF HIGHWAYS
A sovereign state may impose sales and use taxes, it may charge
reasonable fees for inspection of property imported into the state, and
it may exact reasonable charges for the use of its highways. It seems
hardly necessary to refer to the many cases sustaining fees, charges
and taxes which in this manner may increase the cost of business done
across a state boundary. All such taxes must be non-discriminatory
within the limits of a duly recognized class. Fees and charges must
not be extravagantly high.28  Subject to such limitations a license fee
may be required for automobile caravans using the highways in either
intrastate or interstate commerce.
29
The exaction of inspection fees as to imports, the imposition of
taxes on the use of goods imported, and levying of charges for use of
highways, are all closely related. Unified statutory provisions should
be formulated. Steps in this direction have already been made in
regard to sales and use taxes. Uniformity should be extended and
made applicable to all types of state laws which impose taxes or license
charges affecting business done across state lines.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have attempted to indicate the possibility of state competition
in the collection of taxes. The unitary nature of the problem has been
indicated, and possible advantages have been explored which may result
from a general policy of forebearance on the part of hungry states.
The taxpayer frequently finds himself compelled to defend expen-
sive litigation. This is illustrated by the Aldrich case, where, as
pointed out in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, "The
27. Id. at 257, 58 Sup. Ct. at 549, 82 L. Ed. at 829.
28. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 3o6 U. S. 375, 59 Sup. Ct. 526, 83 L. Ed. 771
(939).
29. Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407, 56 Sup. Ct. 756, 8o L. Ed. 1245 (1936).
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issue is whether Utah or New York will correct this tax." Yet the
suit was between the State Tax Commission of Utah and the Admin-
istrators of the Estate of Edward S. Harkness.
Occasionally the Supreme Court of the United States may be
willing to entertain interpleader proceedings for the determination of
questions of domicile, as in Texas v. Florida. But in that very case,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the
inappropriateness of litigation as a solution of problems of competing
claims of states for inheritance taxes:
"The limitations of litigation-its episodic character, its necessarily
restricted scope of inquiry, its confined regard for considerations
of policy, its dependence on the contingencies of a particular record,
and other circumscribing factors-often denature and even muti-
late the actualities of a problem and thereby render the litigious
process unsuited for its solution."
If the courts should be deemed an unsatisfactory instrument for
the solution of problems of multiple taxation, perhaps the Congress of
the United States may be able to undertake the task.
In seeking an answer to this question, let us pause to observe the
present approved doctrines as the power of a state to tax successive
steps in an interstate shipment. In the profound case of McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Co.,3 0 the New York City sales tax was upheld as
to an interstate shipment of coal. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Stone stated: "Here the tax is conditioned upon a local activity, delivery
of goods within the state upon their purchase for consumption." The
dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds
and Roberts pointed out that, by the same token, Pennsylvania might
have taxed the local activity of shipment of the coal from the mines in
that state, and that the transhipment across New Jersey could have
been deemed a local activity whereby that state could have imposed
taxes on an integral part of the same interstate transaction.
Congress, therefore, even when bolstered by the commerce clause,
has as yet failed to prevent, under the McGoldrick case, each state from
imposing nondiscriminatory taxes as to interstate shipments.
In. considering possible remedies for the solution of problems of
multiple state taxation, full consideration must be given to the pro-
posals of Mr. Justice Black to the effect that what we need is wise con-
gressional legislation, based upon a national survey. This view was
first presented in his dissenting opinion in the Gwin, White & Prince
30. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U. S. 33, 6o Sup. Ct. 388, 84 L.
Ed. 565 (1940).
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case,31 in which Mr. Justice Black stood alone. But within a year and
a few weeks two other members of the Supreme Court announced their
adherence to this viewpoint, when Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr.
Justice Douglas joined Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc.,3 2 when he said:
"Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative regula-
tions-must from inherent limitations of the judicial process treat
the subject by the hit or miss method of deciding single local con-
troversies. . . . We would, therefore, leave the questions raised
by the Arkansas Tax for the consideration of Congress in a nation-
wide survey of the constantly increasing barriers to trade among
the States."
It is the belief of the present writer that problems of state taxation
obviously affect the national economy, and that the equitable appor-
tionment of such taxes should be determined on a national scale, not
only as to interstate commerce, but to secure immunity of intangible
personal property from the double taxation on an ad valorem basis,
and also to protect estates from conflicting inheritance taxes, and like-
wise to allocate justly, the imposition of taxes of many sorts on corpo-
rations doing business in more than one state.
When wise tax policies and the basis of understanding have been
formulated it may well be true that congressional action will be needed,
particularly as to those phases of the problem which affect interstate
commerce.
But long before Congress may be ready or willing to follow the
course so strongly desired by Mr. Justice Black and his colleagues,
plans must be intelligently formed and carried forward, looking to the
preparation of legislative drafts based upon principles of mutual fore-
bearance, compromise and reciprocity between the various states.
31. Mr. Justice Black, 305 U. S. 434, 449, 59 Sup. Ct. 325, 329, 83 L. Ed. 272, 282
(1939).
32. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U. S. 176, 183, 188, 6o Sup. Ct.
5o4, 510, 84 L. Ed. 683, 688, 691 (194o).
